Zero Probability by November, Dan D
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zero Probability 
(Unpublished) 
 
 
 
 
 
Dan David November 
  
2 
 
Abstract 
In probability textbooks, it is widely claimed that zero probability does not mean impossibility. 
But what stands behind this claim? In this paper I offer an explanation to this claim based on 
Kolmogorov's formalism. As such, this explanation is relevant to all interpretations of 
Kolmogorov's probability theory. I start by clarifying that this claim refers only to nonempty 
events, since empty events are always considered as impossible. Then, I offer the following three 
reasons for the claim that nonempty events with zero probability are considered as possible: The 
main reason is simply because they are nonempty. Hence, they are considered as possible despite 
their zero probability. The second reason is that sometimes the zero probability is taken to be an 
approximation of some infinitesimal probability value. Such a value is strictly positive and as such 
does not imply impossibility in a strict sense. Finally, the third reason is that there are 
interpretations according to which the same event can have different probabilities. Specifically, it 
is assumed that an event with exactly zero probability (that does not approximate an infinitesimal 
value) can have strictly positive probabilities. This means that such an event can be possible which 
implies that its zero probability does not mean impossibility. 
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1. The main claims 
It is commonly held that zero probability does not mean impossibility. For example, when 
Kolmogorov discusses the relation of his probability theory to experimental data, he writes that: 
"P(A)=0 does not imply the impossibility of A." (Kolmogorov, 1933, p. 5). And Jeffreys in his 
classical textbook "Theory of Probability" asserts that: "[...] a proposition can have probability 0 
and yet be possible [...]" (Jeffreys, 1998, p. 65). Von Plato claims that this idea, that zero 
probability does not mean impossibility, was around even before Kolmogorov formalized his 
theory. To support his claim, he quotes Poincaré from his 1896 book on the calculus of probability: 
"[...] with an infinity of possible results, probability 0 does not always mean impossibility, and 
probability 1 not certainty." (Von Plato, 1994, p. 7). But what is the reason behind the claim that 
zero probability does not mean impossibility? Interestingly, according to Hájek this question not 
been addressed explicitly in the literature: "Indeed, given how many probability textbooks go out 
of their way to caution the reader that ‘probability 0 does not imply impossible’, it is perhaps 
surprising that more is not made of it, at least in philosophical circles." (Hájek, 2003, pp. 285–6). 
In this paper I try to take on Hájek's challenge and explain the reasons for this claim. The 
explanation I offer is based solely on Kolmogorov's formalism and hence relevant to all 
interpretations of Kolmogorov's probability theory. 
Explaining the claim that zero probability does not mean impossibility is important mainly because 
it fills a lacuna in the field of philosophy of probability. But it is also important because it reveals 
new insights on the connection between Kolmogorov's theory and its interpretations. Specifically, 
my explanation reveals that Kolmogorov's formalism can express different senses of 'possibility'. 
These senses are relevant to all its interpretations but are generally not explicitly addressed by 
them. My explanation also reveals that the claim that the same event can have different 
probabilities, is in fact interpretation-dependent. Thus, it does not stem from Kolmogorov's theory. 
This means that it cannot be mathematically justified or refuted based solely on Kolmogorov's 
theory. This conclusion has important implications on the Bayesian framework which I do not 
address in this paper. 
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In this paper I offer an explanation to the claim that zero probability does not mean impossibility, 
based on analyzing the structure of Kolmogorov’s probability space. I begin (in section2) with a 
brief description of the connection between Kolmogorov’s theory and its interpretations. I continue 
(in section3) with a reminder of Kolmogorov's definition of the probability space. Then (in section 
4) I discuss the first sense of 'possibility' expressed by nonempty events in Kolmogorov's 
formalism. The second sense (which I discuss in section 5) is expressed by events having strictly 
positive probabilities. I then distinguish between two cases that are expressed by zero probability 
in Kolmogorov's formalism: infinitesimal probabilities (discussed in section 6) and exactly zero 
probability (section 7). The latter case raises questions regarding equivalence relations between 
events in Kolmogorov's theory (which I address in section 8). Finally, I conclude. 
 
 
2. Interpretations of probability and Kolmogorov's probability theory 
"Interpretations of probability"1 is a term commonly used to describe all the different theories 
which deal mainly with the notions: 'event' and 'probability'. These theories express the large 
disagreement that exists among philosophers regarding these notions. The interpretations give 
different answers to the question: "what are 'event' and 'probability'?". A very important aspect of 
the required answer is the mathematical part of the definitions of 'event' and 'probability'. This part 
is standardly (though not universally) given by Kolmogorov's probability theory. According to 
Gillies: "The theory of probability has a mathematical aspect and a foundational or philosophical 
aspect. There is a remarkable contrast between the two. While an almost complete consensus and 
agreement exists about the mathematics, there is a wide divergence of opinions about the 
philosophy." (Gillies, 2000, p. 1).  
Mathematical probability theories (such as Kolmogorov's) are treated as distinct from their 
interpretations. According to Lyon, the two types of theories aim to answer different questions 
regarding the notion of probability: "In philosophy of probability, there are two main questions 
that we are concerned with. The first question is: what is the correct mathematical theory of 
                                                 
1 For good surveys of the interpretations of probability see: (Gillies, 2000; Hájek, 2012) and (Von Plato, 1994) for a 
more historical perspective. 
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probability? [...] These formal theories of probability tell us how probabilities behave, how to 
calculate probabilities from other probabilities, but they do not tell us what probabilities are. This 
leads us to the second central question in philosophy of probability: just what are probabilities? 
[...] philosophers have tried to answer this question. Such answers are typically called 
interpretations of probability, or philosophical theories of probability." (Lyon, 2010, p. 93). In 
other words, mathematical probability theories provide the mathematical parts of the definitions 
of 'event' and 'probability' while their interpretations describe the non-mathematical (interpretive) 
parts. This dichotomy is not entirely accurate, because the mathematical and the interpretive parts 
are connected and affect each other. The mathematical parts have implications for the interpretive 
parts (such as imposing restrictions on them) and vice versa. This means that Kolmogorov's theory 
explicitly deals with the mathematical parts, but also implicitly deals (at least partially) with the 
interpretive parts. The interpretive aspects which are implicitly described by Kolmogorov's theory 
are common to all interpretations of his theory, simply because these aspects stem from the 
restrictions imposed by the mathematical parts. Realizing this is important for my explanation 
since its focus is on the interpretive features which stem from Kolmogorov's theory. This focus is 
what makes my explanation relevant to all interpretations of Kolmogorov's theory.  
A "complete" probability theory (a theory that is composed out of a mathematical probability 
theory and an interpretation of it) describes what I call: "probabilistic states". In other words, 
anything describable by a probability theory is a probabilistic state. According to Gyenis and 
Rédei: "Interpretations of probability are typical classes of applications of probability theory, 
classes consisting of applications that possess some common features, which the interpretation 
isolates and analyses." (Gyenis & Rédei, 2014, p. 19). Thus, it can be said that each of the 
interpretations of Kolmogorov's theory tries to provide in non-mathematical terms a general 
description of a collection of probabilistic states describable by his theory. 
The main characteristic of a probabilistic state is that it involves at least two different possibilities 
(or alternatives, or options). For example, a probabilistic state of an ideal coin toss involves the 
possibility of the coin landing on 'heads' and the possibility of it landing on 'tails'. Similarly, a 
probabilistic state of an agent picking an integer from the set {0,5,2,7,8,11} includes each of the 
six options of picking one of these integers and perhaps also the option of not picking any of them. 
6 
 
A state which includes only one possibility is normally not considered a probabilistic one2. The 
possibilities of a probabilistic state are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, which means that there 
are no other alternatives which are relevant to it. Moreover, it is assumed that one of these 
possibilities necessarily occurs (or manifests, or happens). For example, an ideal coin toss does 
not include the possibility of the coin landing on its side (and hence landing not on 'heads' or 'tails') 
- this option is simply not part of the ideal state. It is important to clarify that possibilities are not 
events! Thus, a possibility does not have a probability. (Contrary to an event which is a set of 
possibilities that does have a certain probability.) This clarification is important for a claim which 
I will make later in this paper, that a nonempty event is considered as possible simply because it 
contains possibilities. In the meantime, this crude characterization of probabilistic states seems to 
capture the common feature of all the things describable by Kolmogorov's theory. 
Here I would like to mention that Kolmogorov's theory has reached a status of orthodoxy despite 
having known objections to it3. It is largely preferred over other mathematical probability theories 
which have different and not necessarily equivalent formal definitions of 'event' and 'probability'4. 
Hence Kolmogorov's theory is almost universally treated to as the (mathematical) probability 
theory. As a result, the different interpretations are commonly thought of as interpretations of 
Kolmogorov's theory5. The fact that Kolmogorov's formalization of 'event' and 'probability' is so 
widely accepted is the reason I focus on it. 
 
In the next section I present a definition of Kolmogorov's probability space. I highlight the points 
that are relevant to my explanation of the claim that zero probability does not mean impossibility. 
 
                                                 
2 Interestingly, Kolmogorov's probability space can in fact describe probabilistic states which include only one 
possibility. However, such a state, by definition, has exactly one event with probability 1 and hence does not seem to 
mathematically describe anything that is normally considered probabilistic. 
3 See Lyon (2010) for a general discussion on the problems Kolmogorov's theory has in relation to the different 
interpretations. Also see Lyon (2016) for a more detailed discussion on some of the possible objections to 
Kolmogorov's axioms. And see Hájek (2003) for an objection to the definition of conditional probability which is a 
specific part of Kolmogorov's theory. 
4 See for example: Goosens (1979); Popper (1938, 1955, 1959, Chapter 8); Rényi (1955). 
5 The main interpretations of probability are in fact not interpretations of Kolmogorov's theory in a strict sense. See 
Hájek (2012) and especially Lyon (2016) on this issue. 
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3. The definition of the probability space 
My explanation of the claim that zero probability does not mean impossibility is based on 
Kolmogorov's probability space's structure. In this section I give its definition6 and emphasize 
some aspects which are important for my explanation. 
A probability space is defined as a triple <Ω,Σ,P> consisting of the following three components: a 
sample space (Ω), a σ-algebra (Σ) and a probability measure (P). 
The probability space's components are defined as follows: 
1. A sample space (Ω) - a nonempty set 
The members of the sample space are sometimes called "elementary events" but nevertheless, they 
are not a mathematical formalization of 'events'. 'Events' are defined by the σ-algebra component 
(the definition of which will be given shortly). However, these members are indeed elementary in 
the sense that 'events' and 'probabilities' depend on them. Moreover, these members formally 
describe the different possibilities (or alternatives, or options) which are the characterizing feature 
of every probabilistic state7. Recall that these possibilities are mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
so as the members of the sample space. 
'Events' are formally defined by the σ-algebra component8:  
2. A σ-algebra (Σ) (defined over the sample space) - a subset of the power set of the sample space 
(i.e. a set of subsets of Ω) which satisfies the following three conditions: 
2.1. Σ is not empty (or, equivalently, Ω is in Σ) 
2.2. Σ is closed under complementation (i.e. if A is in Σ then so is Ω\A) 
                                                 
6 The definition of Kolmogorov's probability space presented in this paper, is one of several standard ways to define 
it. See Billingsley (1995, p. 23) for a similar yet more rigorous definition.  
7 See November (2018, Chapter 1) for a detailed analysis of the interpretive meaning of the sample space component 
of Kolmogorov's probability space. 
8 More accurately, since the sample space is necessary for the σ-algebra's definition (the σ-algebra is defined over a 
given sample space), 'events' are formally defined by both components together. 
8 
 
2.3. Σ is closed under countable unions (i.e. if , , … are in Σ, then so is  =  ∪  ∪
 ∪ …) 
The members of Σ are the mathematical definition of 'events'. Which means that mathematically 
'events' are sets that together form a σ-algebra. Since the σ-algebra is defined over a specific sample 
space, mathematically 'events' are sets of members of a sample space. Hence, loosely speaking, an 
event (A) can be thought of as a collection of some of the possibilities which constitute a given 
probabilistic state. The happening (or occurrence, or manifestation) of any one of A's possibilities 
is the happening (or occurrence, etc.) of A. Similarly, the complementary event of event A (Ac) is 
a collection of all the possibilities which are not in A. Hence, Ac can be thought of as the case that 
A does not happen. Thus, when a possibility happens (or manifests, etc.) it is either in A, which 
means that A happens, or in Ac (and hence not in A) which means that A does not happen.  
Notice that the σ-algebra always contains the sample space event and the empty event (i.e. ∅, Ω ∈
Σ). Hence these events can be called the "mandatory events". Another important point to notice is 
that the σ-algebra is also connected to a specific probability measure. Realizing this is important 
for understanding the relation between events and probabilities. As I will show in sections 7 and 
8, it is especially important for defining an identity relation between events. 
 
3. A probability measure (P) - a real valued function defined over Σ which satisfies the following 
conditions: 
3.1. P is non-negative 
3.2. P∅ = 0 
3.3. P is countably additive (which means that for all countable collections  of pairwise 
disjoint sets, P⋃   = 	∑ P ) 
3.4. P returns values in the unit interval [0,1] and PΩ = 1 
The values assigned to the members of the σ-algebra by the probability-measure function are the 
mathematical definition of 'probabilities' in Kolmogorov's theory. In other words, mathematically 
'probabilities' are the values of a function from a σ-algebra of a given probability space to the unit 
interval which satisfies certain conditions (described by the definition of the probability measure).  
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Two points regarding the definition of the probability measure are important for my explanation 
of the claim that zero probability does not mean impossibility. The first concerns the probability 
values of the two mandatory events. By definition, the probability of the empty event is 0 and the 
probability of the sample space event is 1. Each of these events cannot have any other probability 
value. This fact about these events distinguishes them from other events. Any event, which is not 
a mandatory event, can have any probability value assigned to it by the probability measure 
function9. This is because the same σ-algebra can have infinitely many probability measures 
defined over it10. Thus, all events necessarily have probabilities, but only the mandatory events 
necessarily have particular probability values (the empty event necessarily has 0 probability and 
the sample space event necessarily has 1). All other events can have any probability value in the 
range [0,1]. The second point is that probabilities are real numbers between 0 and 1 inclusively. 
This means that according to this definition, probability values are not, and cannot be, surreal 
numbers. And more specifically they cannot be infinitesimals11. This fact is important for cases of 
supposedly infinitesimal probability. Loosely speaking, in such cases, when an event with 
infinitesimal probability is described by Kolmogorov theory, it is assigned zero probability by the 
probability measure function. The zero probability approximates its infinitesimal probability 
value12. I elaborate this point in section 6. 
 
In the literature of philosophy of probability, it is quite common to find other mathematical 
definitions of 'event' and 'probability' which seem to be different from Kolmogorov's definition of 
the probability space. Specifically, 'events' are commonly mathematically defined using an algebra 
without the explicit mention of a sample space. However, since an algebra is a type of an algebraic 
structure, it is in fact a set with operations defined on it. This means that an algebra always has an 
underlying set which plays the same role as the sample space plays in Kolmogorov's definition 
                                                 
9 Assuming that the probabilities of all the events together satisfy the definition of the probability measure. 
10 Except for when the σ-algebra is a trivial one (a σ-algebra that contains only the two mandatory events). The only 
probability measure that can be defined over a trivial σ-algebra is its corresponding trivial probability measure which 
assigns 1 to the sample space event and 0 to the empty event. 
11 Probabilities also cannot be numbers which involve infinitesimals in their definitions, such as probabilities of the 
form  =  ± , 0 ≤  ≤ 1, when  is a real number in the interval [0,1] and  is an infinitesimal. 
12 In the domain of the reals, zero can approximates an infinitesimal similarly to how a rational number in the domain 
of the rational numbers can approximates a real number. For example, 3    is an approximation of π. 
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(see  Gilbert & Nicholson (2004, p. 4)). Thus, the common way of mathematically defining 'events' 
and 'probabilities' using only an algebra and a probability measure, is just a partial description of 
the relevant Kolmogorovian probability space because it lacks an explicit mention of the sample 
space. Realizing this is important since it means that the explanation I present in this paper is 
relevant even to those who mathematically define 'events' without the explicit mention of a sample 
space.  
 
A word about notation, in the rest of this paper I use "event" and "probability" (without inverted 
commas) to denote the two notions 'event' and 'probability' that have both a mathematical part and 
an interpretive part13. I use "k-event" and "k-probability" (without inverted commas) to denote the 
mathematical parts of these notions given by Kolmogorov's probability theory. In other words, 
given a probability space (S), a k-event is a member of the σ-algebra of S and a k-probability is a 
value of the probability measure of S. 
 
In the following sections I discuss two different senses of 'possibility' that are mathematically 
expressed by Kolmogorov's probability space. I would like to clarify that these senses of 
'possibility' are not the senses (or kinds) of possibility that appear in discussions about modality. 
In such discussions it is common to distinguish for example between logical possibility, physical 
possibility, metaphysical possibility and other kinds of possibility14. It is possible (no pun 
intended) to try and identify such senses of 'possibility' with those expressed by Kolmogorov's 
probability space, but since it is not relevant for my explanation, it is not part of this paper. 
 
 
4. The first sense of possibility – being a nonempty event 
                                                 
13 An 'event' can be a state of the world (the actual world or a counterfactual one), a proposition or a sentence in a 
formal language etc. and a 'probability' can be either chance, propensity, credence or degree of belief etc. depending 
on one's choice of interpretation of probability. 
14 See Kment (2017) on this topic. 
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The first sense of possibility expressed by Kolmogorov's probability space stems from the 
definition of k-events as sets. Events that are mathematically described by nonempty k-events 
(hereinafter, nonempty events) are commonly considered as possible. While events that are 
mathematically described by the empty k-event (hereinafter, empty events) are always considered 
as impossible15. Roughly, being a nonempty event means that the event is a nonempty collection 
of the different possibilities (or alternatives, or options) which constitute a particular probabilistic 
state. And in that sense, the event is possible. In contrast to empty events which are empty 
collections of those possibilities and hence are impossible.  
It is easy to understand this sense of possibility by analyzing the empty k-event. The empty k-
event is an empty subset of a given sample space. Hence, any event that is correctly described by 
the empty k-event, loosely speaking, is an empty collection of the different possibilities (or options, 
etc.) which constitute a particular probabilistic state. In other words, given a probabilistic state, the 
empty event is the case that none of its possibilities occurs (or manifests, or happens). But since 
these possibilities are exhaustive, one of them necessarily occurs. Recall that this characteristic of 
a probabilistic state is an essential one. It is true for every probabilistic state. Thus, the case that 
none of the possibilities occurs, is not possible. To illustrate this point, recall the example of an 
ideal coin toss. It includes only two possibilities: the coin landing on 'heads' or 'tails'. The option 
that the coin does not land on either 'heads' or 'tails' simply does not exist in this probabilistic state. 
The empty event in this example does not include any of the possibilities which can occur in this 
particular probabilistic state and hence it is impossible. This is true for any empty event in any 
probabilistic state – they are simply impossible. 
This point can be made in a different way. Recall that the empty k-event is the complementary k-
event of the sample space k-event. The sample space k-event is composed out of all the members 
of a given sample space. It mathematically describes an event which is a collection of all the 
different possibilities (or alternatives, or options, etc.) which constitute a particular probabilistic 
state. In other words, given a probabilistic state S, the sample space k-event describes the event 
that any one of the possibilities which constitutes S occurs (or manifests, etc.). And since one of 
these possibilities necessarily occurs (there are no other possibilities), the event described by the 
                                                 
15 The empty k-event is even referred to as "an impossible event" by Kolmogorov himself, see Kolmogorov (1933, p. 
5,6) 
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sample space k-event is certain to happen. As a result, its complementary event, the empty event, 
is certain not to happen. Recall that a complementary event of event A can be thought of as the 
case that A does not happen. Thus, the empty event can be thought of as the case that the sample 
space does not happen. But since the sample space event is certain to happen, the case that it does 
not happen is impossible. In other words, it is impossible for the empty event to happen. Which 
again brings us to the conclusion that any empty event is impossible. In short, the empty event is 
impossible in the sense that it does not correspond to any of the possibilities which constitute a 
particular probabilistic state. This means that any event that is not the empty event, i.e. any 
nonempty event, is possible in the sense that it does correspond to at least one of these possibilities.  
 
The claim that zero probability does not mean impossibility does not refer to empty events. Empty 
events are always considered as impossible. Notice that an empty event is both empty and has 
probability zero. That is because it is described by the empty k-event which has zero probability 
by definition. Thus, empty events are impossible because they are empty and because they have 
zero probability. 
 
In the next sections I analyze the senses of possibility expressed by the probabilities of the events. 
This will enable me to clarify why nonempty events with zero probability are commonly 
considered as possible. Very roughly, I will claim that they are considered as possible because they 
are nonempty and despite having zero probability.  
 
 
5. The second sense of possibility – having a strictly positive probability 
This short section concerns with the sense of possibility expressed by strictly positive probability 
values of events. Very roughly, events that have strictly positive probability values are considered 
as possible. The exact sense of possibility expressed by having a strictly positive probability 
depends on one's choice of interpretation of probability. For example, according to some objective 
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interpretations, having a strictly positive probability means that the relative frequency of that event 
in a series of trials is strictly positive. And according to some subjective interpretations, having a 
strictly positive probability means that the degree of belief of an agent in that event is strictly 
positive, etc. In general, according to each of the main interpretations of probability, an event that 
has a strictly positive probability is considered as possible in a sense determined by the 
interpretation. 
It is sometimes claimed that events that have low, yet strictly positive probability values are not 
"practically" possible. For example: "[…] a sufficiently high probability can be considered 
'practically certain,' and a sufficiently low correspondingly 'practically impossible.' " (Von Plato, 
1994, p. 44). This claim is important; however, it relies on making a distinction between "practical" 
possibility and "theoretical" possibility or something of that sort. Such distinctions are bases on 
some metaphysical assumptions which are not part of (and are not mathematically described by) 
Kolmogorov's formalism. These distinctions are closely related to the types of possibility which 
appear in the literature about modality. As such they are not discussed in this paper. The purpose 
of this paper is to explain why zero probability does not mean impossibility based on Kolmogorov's 
formalism without relying on additional assumptions which are not necessarily common to all its 
interpretations.  
 
Events that have zero probability are also commonly considered as possible for several reasons 
which I discuss in the next sections.  
 
 
6. Probability zero – the case of infinitesimal probability 
Arguably16 there are probabilistic states in which there are events with infinitesimal probabilities. 
Such cases cannot be accurately described by Kolmogorov's probability space simply because k-
probabilities values cannot be infinitesimals. Recall that k-probability values are real numbers in 
                                                 
16 I use "arguably" here since there are different objections to the idea of infinitesimal probabilities. See for example: 
Elga (2004); Williamson (2007). 
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the range [0,1] and as such they are not infinitesimals. Hence, infinitesimal probabilities are either 
not described in Kolmogorov's theory or are described inaccurately (or approximately) by zero k-
probability.  
For example, a fair lottery over the natural numbers is often described as a case in which there are 
(or there should be) events with infinitesimal probabilities. For the lottery to be fair, all events 
corresponding to one result of the lottery (i.e. that the result is a natural number n) should have the 
same probability. The question is, what is this probability? It turns out that in Kolmogorov's 
framework answering this question is not simple. In fact, strictly speaking, this lottery cannot be 
described by Kolmogorov's theory. The reason is that the k-probability of all k-events describing 
these events must be a real number that is either zero or strictly positive. In the former case, the k-
probability of their union is 0 and, in the latter, it is ∞. Notice that their union is the sample space 
k-event (Ω). Hence, in both cases the k-probability of the sample space k-event is not 1 (it is either 
0 or ∞) in contrast to the definition of the probability measure which asserts that PΩ = 1. This 
seems to imply that according to Kolmogorov's theory there cannot be a fair lottery over the natural 
numbers. More generally, it is impossible to describe a uniform distribution over any infinite set 
of nonempty events using Kolmogorov's theory17. Thus, according to Kolmogorov's theory, 
infinitely many nonempty events cannot be uniformly distributed (they can only be nonuniformly 
distributed). To avoid this conclusion, some scholars have suggested that the range of 
Kolmogorov's probability measure should be changed to include infinitesimals. Their suggestion 
is based on the idea that in there are cases in which there are events with infinitesimal probabilities. 
Event with infinitesimal probability that are mathematically described by k-events with zero k-
probability are commonly considered as possible despite their mathematical description. For these 
events, the zero k-probability is not thought of as an accurate mathematical description of the 
described infinitesimal probability. The key point is that the infinitesimal probability of the 
described event is indeed small (infinitesimally so) but it is not zero! - it is strictly positive. And 
                                                 
17 The inability to describe a uniform distribution over any infinite set of nonempty events, is considered as a major 
drawback to Kolmogorov's formalism (see  Lyon (2016)). Mainly because there does not seem to be an a priori reason 
for rejecting a uniform distribution of probabilities over an infinite set of events while accepting any nonuniform 
distribution (that satisfies the probability measure's definition). There are different attempts to amend this drawback. 
For example, see Gwiazda (2010) for a solution using "Asymptotic Density" (phrased as a response to this problem 
as it is presented in Armstrong & McCall (1989)), and see Wenmackers & Horsten (2012) for a solution using non-
standard analysis. 
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since commonly an event with a strictly positive probability is not considered as impossible (but 
rather as possible) an event with infinitesimal probability is also not considered as impossible18.  
In other words, when an event with infinitesimal probability is described by a k-event with zero k-
probability, this description is taken to be inaccurate (or an approximation). Hence the zero k-
probability is not taken to imply (or to indicate) that the described event is impossible. Notice that 
a nonempty event with an infinitesimal probability is considered as possible in at least two senses 
of possibility: it is nonempty, and it has a strictly positive probability. This is despite being 
formally described by a k-event with zero k-probability. Thus, the zero k-probability is not taken 
to mean impossibility because it is just a mathematical approximation of the event's infinitesimal 
probability. In other words, the zero k-probability is a mathematical description which 
approximates a probability value that is not zero. In the next section I discuss cases where the 
probability value is exactly zero. 
 
 
7. Probability zero – the case of exactly zero probability 
This section deals with nonempty events with zero probability. Pay attention that the probability 
of these events is exactly zero and not an infinitesimal number. Such events are mathematically 
described by nonempty k-events with zero k-probability. Since the probability of the described 
events is exactly zero, the zero k-probability that mathematically describes it, is an accurate 
description. In contrast to cases of infinitesimal probabilities when the zero k-probability only 
approximates these probabilities. 
Nonempty events with zero probability are commonly considered as possible despite having zero 
probability. The reason is twofold. First, these events are nonempty and hence are considered as 
possible in the sense discussed in section 4 (briefly, a nonempty event is possible in the sense that 
it is a nonempty collection of possibilities which constitute a particular probabilistic state). The 
second reason is roughly that such events are thought of as contingently having zero probability 
                                                 
18 One plausible claim is that an event with an infinitesimal probability is practically impossible. But as I already 
mentioned above, such a claim relies on some distinction between practical and theoretical possibility which I do not 
address in this paper. 
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(as opposed to necessarily having it). Loosely speaking, even if a nonempty event with exactly 
zero probability is considered as impossible, it is not considered as necessarily impossible. Thus, 
it is possible (in a sense which will be discussed in the next sections) for such an event to be 
possible (in the sense discussed in section 5). This claim, that it is possible for such events to be 
possible, is based on the idea that the same event can have different probabilities. More accurately, 
the idea is that the same nonempty and non-sample-space event can have different probabilities. 
Recall that an empty event necessarily has probability 0 and a sample space event necessarily has 
probability 1, thus they cannot have other probabilities. This idea specifically implies that 
nonempty events with zero probability can have strictly positive probability values. This is 
important since events with strictly positive probabilities are commonly considered as possible 
according to each of the main interpretations of probability (when the exact sense of possibility is 
determined by the interpretation). Hence the claim that a nonempty event has zero probability only 
contingently, means that it can have strictly positive probability values. This implies that such an 
event is possible, loosely speaking. 
The idea that the same event can have different probabilities is important for my explanation of 
the second reason why nonempty events with zero probability are possible. Simply because it is a 
necessary condition for the claim that these events have zero probability only contingently. 
Clearly, if the same event cannot have different probabilities, then a nonempty event with zero 
probability cannot have strictly positive probabilities. In this case, a nonempty event with zero 
probability can be considered as possible only in the sense discussed in section 4. In other words, 
if a nonempty event with zero probability cannot have strictly positive probabilities, it can be 
considered as possible only because it is nonempty and despite having zero probability. 
Obviously, the idea that the same event can have different probabilities depends on the exact 
meaning of "same event". This idea assumes that the identity relation between events does not 
depend on their probabilities. Such a relation implies that the probability of an event is not one of 
its essential properties. More accurately, any event necessarily has a probability value, but not 
necessarily that particular probability value (unless it is an empty event or a sample space event 
that necessarily have 0 and 1 probability values respectively). 
On the face of it, the claim that the probability of an event is not one of its essential properties 
seems quite reasonable. For example, it seems plausible to claim that the probability that a given 
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coin lands 'tails', can be any value in the range [0,1]. The probability can be 1/2 when the coin is 
fair, and all relevant conditions are "normal" so to speak. Or it can be any value in the range [0,1] 
when the coin is biased or if the conditions are "abnormal", etc. Hence, this example seems to 
show that the same event - a coin lands 'tails' - can have different probability values, including zero 
probability.  
The key point behind the idea that the same event can have different probabilities is that the 
underlying identity relation between events does not depend on their probabilities. Notice that 
objecting to such identity relation amounts to rejecting the assumption that the probability of an 
event is not one of its essential properties. In other words, objecting to the idea that the same event 
can have different probabilities, means that each event necessarily has a specific probability value. 
Thus, any change in the event's probability would mean that the event itself has changed as well. 
This conclusion may pose a problem for some interpretations of probability. In other words, 
holding that the probability of an event is one of its essential properties might be problematic for 
some interpretations. Specifically, it does not seem to sit well with the Bayesian framework in 
which it is commonly said that the probability of a given event is updated in light of new evidence. 
 
Identity relations of both types, those which depend on the events' probabilities and those which 
do not, can be justified in different ways. However, and this is the crucial point, none of these 
relations stems from Kolmogorov's mathematical definition of k-events! In other words, the 
definition of k-events is compatible with both the claim that the probability of an event is one of 
its essential properties and with its negation. The reason is roughly that events with different 
probabilities (whether they are considered as the same event with different probabilities or 
different events altogether) are mathematically described by different probability spaces. But in 
Kolmogorov's theory there is no explicit definition according to which two k-events are said to be 
two mathematical descriptions of the same event. In other words, there is no equivalence relation 
between k-events in the sense that they describe the same events. Thus, Kolmogorov's theory 
cannot support nor refute the claim that the probability of an event is one of its essential properties. 
I elaborate this point in the next section. 
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To sum up, nonempty events with exactly zero probability are commonly considered as possible 
for two reasons: The first is that they are nonempty and hence are possible in the sense discussed 
in section 4. The second reason is that the fact that they have zero probability is commonly thought 
of as contingent and not as a necessary fact. This means that such events can have strictly positive 
probability values. Loosely speaking, it is possible for such events to be possible in the sense 
discussed in section 5 and hence they are possible. This second reason is based on the idea that the 
same event can have different probabilities. In other words, the identity relation between events 
does not depend on their probabilities. However, this idea does not stem from Kolmogorov's 
definition of k-events! Moreover, it cannot be justified or refuted by their definition. This means 
that the second reason for claiming that nonempty events with zero probability are possible, is not 
based on Kolmogorov's formalism! It is possible to try and add to Kolmogorov's theory different 
equivalence relations between k-events which will express either the idea that the same event can 
have different probabilities or its negation. But in both these cases, such additions will not serve 
as a mathematical justification or refutation of this idea. Simply because they are additions to the 
theory and not an integral part of it. In the next section I discuss some important aspects concerning 
these putative equivalence relations. 
 
 
8. Equivalence relations between k-events 
In the previous section I mentioned two reasons for the claim that nonempty events with zero 
probability are possible. The first is that they are nonempty and the second is that they can have 
strictly positive probability values. The second reason means that such events are possible because, 
loosely speaking, they can be possible. This explanation rests on the idea that the same event can 
have different probabilities. However, this idea does not stem from Kolmogorov's definition of k-
events. Moreover, it is neither justified nor refuted by Kolmogorov's theory. Kolmogorov's theory 
does not include an explicit definition of when two k-events are said to be "equivalent" in the sense 
that they mathematically describe the same event(s). In other words, there is no explicit 
equivalence relation between k-events in Kolmogorov's theory. Such a relation is necessary for 
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one to mathematically justify or refute the idea that the same event can have different probability 
values. 
In this section I demonstrate that Kolmogorov's theory can accommodate both types of equivalence 
relations between k-events: those which support the claim that the same event can have different 
probabilities, and those which undermine it. I explain that deciding between these types cannot be 
done based solely on Kolmogorov's theory. Thus, the answer to the question whether the same 
event can have different probabilities, turns out to be interpretation-dependent. This means that the 
claim that nonempty events have zero probability only contingently, is interpretation-dependent.  
 
In Kolmogorov's theory there is no explicit equivalence relation between k-events in the sense that 
they mathematically describe the same event. This means that there is no way of determining 
whether two different k-events mathematically describe the same events or not. Part of the problem 
is that there is no explicit (and non-trivial) identity relation between k-events19. Thus, there is no 
explicit way of determining whether two k-events are the same or not. Specifically, the set-
theoretic identity relation, is not an adequate equivalence relation between k-events (and is also 
not an identity relation between them). 
Recall that according to their definition, k-events are sets which together compose a σ-algebra. 
Thus, they can be compared as sets. According to the set-theoretic identity relation, two k-events 
are identical if and only if they have the same members. However, this criterion is insufficient for 
determining that two k-events are equivalent in the sense that they describe the same event.  
For example, according to this relation, the k-event !" = 1 which is part of the σ-algebra Σ, =
#∅, Ω, 1, 2% defined over the sample space Ω, = 1,2 is identical to the k-event !& = 1 
which is part of the σ-algebra Σ'( = )ℕ (i.e. Σ'( is the power set of the natural numbers) 
defined over the sample space Ω( = ℕ (where ℕ is the set of natural numbers). However, despite 
being identical in set-theoretical terms, the k-events !" and !& are commonly not considered as 
equivalent mathematical descriptions of the same events. On the other hand, !" and the k-event 
                                                 
19 According to the trivial identity relation between k-events, given a probability space, each of its k-events is identical 
only to itself. This means specifically that k-events from different probability spaces are never the same k-event. 
20 
 
!+ = 3 which is part of the σ-algebra Σ, = ,∅, Ω,, 3, 4. defined over the sample space 
Ω, = 3,4 are commonly considered as two mathematical descriptions of the same events 
despite being set-theoretically different.  
These examples show that the set-theoretic identity relation is not suitable to be an equivalence 
relation between k-events. Two k-events can be set-theoretically identical and still be considered 
as non-equivalent and vice versa: two k-events can be considered as equivalent and yet be set-
theoretically different. The reason is roughly that k-events are defined as part of given probability 
spaces, but the set-theoretical identity relation is oblivious to that. More specifically, given two k-
events, the structures of the σ-algebras to which they belong, seem to be necessary for determining 
whether they are equivalent or not.  
For example, the following two probability spaces contain set-theoretically different k-events. 
However, these probability spaces seem to be two different mathematical descriptions of the same 
probabilistic states. They seem to have the same structure despite having different components and 
thus different k-events. The major difference between them is the members of their sample spaces. 
In the first probability space, the members of the sample space are {1,2} and in the second they 
are {3,4}. All other differences between these probability spaces are derived from this difference 
between their sample spaces. Let )/, = 〈Ω,, Σ,, P,〉 where Ω, = 1,2, Σ, =
,∅, Ω,, 1, 2. and P, assigns the following values to the k-events in Σ,: P,∅ =
0, 	P,2Ω,3 = 1, P,1 =  , P,2 =

. And )/, = 〈Ω,, Σ,, P,〉 where Ω, =
3,4, Σ, = ,∅, Ω,, 3, 4. and P, assigns the following k-probabilities to the k-events in 
Σ,: P,∅ = 0, 	P,2Ω,3 = 1, P,3 =  , P,4 =

.  
The probability spaces )/, and )/, are commonly considered as equivalent. The difference 
between their corresponding sample spaces seem to be irrelevant for determining which 
probabilistic states can be mathematically described by them. In other words, any probabilistic 
state mathematically describable by )/, is also describable by )/, and vice versa. Given a 
probabilistic state mathematically describable by )/,, it is possible to describe it using )/, 
simply by mapping the members '1' and '2' from )/, to the members '3' and '4' from )/, 
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respectively. Thus, any events describable by the k-events {1} and {2} which belong to )/, can 
be described by the k-events {3} and {4} which belong to )/, respectively, and vice versa. 
Loosely speaking, the "names" of these equivalent k-events seem to be irrelevant for determining 
the set of events mathematically describable by them20. 
 
Hence, it seems that an equivalence relation between k-events must rely on some sort of an 
equivalence relation between either σ-algebras (and sample spaces) or whole probability spaces. 
In other words, the question is, given different probability spaces, does an equivalence relation 
between their k-events involves their probability measure components or only the σ-algebras? The 
first option means that an equivalence relation between k-events does not depend on their k-
probabilities and the latter means that it does. The problem is that in Kolmogorov's theory there is 
no explicit equivalence relation between probability spaces or their components21. The question 
whether an equivalence relation between k-events, relies on an equivalence relation between σ-
algebras or between whole probability spaces, is directly related to the idea that the same event 
can have different probabilities. An equivalence relation between σ-algebras ignores the k-
probabilities of their k-events, and thus can support this idea. While an equivalence relation 
between probability spaces, does not ignore the k-probabilities of the k-events and as such, 
undermines this idea. 
This point can be nicely illustrated by the following example. In this example there are two 
probability spaces that have the same sample space and σ-algebra components but different 
probability measures. This means that the σ-algebra components are equivalent because they are 
in fact the same σ-algebra. The answer to the question are the k-events in these two probability 
spaces equivalent or not, reflects one's position on the idea whether the same event can have 
                                                 
20 Notice that there are infinitely many more probability spaces which are equivalent to )/, in the sense that they 
mathematically describe the same set of probabilistic states. For example, any probability space of the following form 
is commonly considered as equivalent to )/,: Let )/,4,5 = 〈Ω,6,7, Σ,6,7, P,6,7〉 be a probability space where n 
and m are natural numbers and 8 ≠ :, Ω,6,7 = 8,:, Σ,6,7 = ,∅, Ω,6,7, n, m. and P2,n,m assigns the following 
k-probabilities to the k-events in Σ,6,7: P,6,7∅ = 0, 	P,6,72Ω,6,73 = 1, P,6,7n =  , P,6,7m =

. Since 
there are infinitely many natural numbers, there are infinitely many probability spaces of this form. 
21 Kolmogorov's theory has implicit trivial equivalence between probability spaces and between σ-algebras. These 
relations are simply the identity relations which are also equivalence relations by definition. According to these 
relations, a σ-algebra or a probability space is equivalent only to itself. 
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different probabilities or not. Let )/, be the probability space defined above (i.e. )/, =
〈Ω,, Σ,, P,〉), and let )/, = 〈Ω,, Σ,, P,〉 be a probability space that has the same sample 
space and σ-algebra components as )/, but a different probability measure. The probability 
measure P, assigns the following k-probabilities to the k-events in Σ,: P,∅ =
0, 	P,2Ω,3 = 1, P,1 =  , P,2 =

. In other words, the k-events {1} and {2} which 
belong to )/, have the k-probabilities 1/2 and 1/2 respectively, while the k-events {1} and {2} 
which belong to )/, have the k-probabilities 1/3 and 2/3 respectively.  
Claiming that the k-events which belong to )/, are equivalent to those which belong to )/, 
seems to support the idea that the same event can have different probabilities. Since, for example, 
any event described by the k-event {1} can have probability 1/2 or probability 1/322. On the other 
hand, claiming that the k-events which belong to )/, are not equivalent to those which belong to 
)/,, undermines this idea. Since the only difference between the k-event {1} of )/, and the k-
event {1} of )/,, is their corresponding k-probabilities. This means that the only difference 
between the events mathematically described by the k-event {1} of )/, and those described by 
{1} of )/,, is their probabilities. Thus, if the events describable by the k-event {1} of )/, are 
said to be different than those describable by {1} of )/,, then having different probability values 
is what makes them different. This implies that the same event cannot have different probabilities 
because having different probabilities is what makes otherwise identical events, different. 
 
Lastly, I would like to clarify why the fact that the same k-event can have different k-probabilities, 
does not imply that the same event can have different probabilities. The reason is roughly because 
the relation between probabilistic states and probability spaces, is many to many. This means that 
it is possible that every time a k-event has a different k-probability, it mathematically describes a 
different event. 
                                                 
22 More accurately, the event described by the k-event {1} can have a probability value mathematically described by 
the k-probability 1/2 or a value described by the k-probability 1/3. Assuming that these k-probabilities are accurate 
descriptions of the event's probability (and not an approximation of it) implies that the same event can have different 
probabilities. 
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Recall that it is commonly held that the same probabilistic state can be mathematically described 
by different probability spaces (as was shown in the above examples). It is also commonly held 
that the same probability space can mathematically describe different probabilistic states. For 
example, the probability space )/, which was defined above ()/, = 〈Ω,, Σ,, P,〉, Ω, =
1,2, Σ, = ,∅, Ω,, 1, 2. and P,: P,∅ = 0, 	P,2Ω,3 = 1, P,1 =  , P,2 =

) can be a mathematical description of different probabilistic states. Such as an ideal coin toss of 
a fair coin, or the parity of the number of leaves on a given tree (having no information regarding 
this tree, trees in general, leaves, or any other relevant information.). And seemingly, there can be 
infinitely many other such states. Hence this example illustrates the claim that the same probability 
space can describe different probabilistic states. This claim together with the claim that the same 
probabilistic state can be described by different probability spaces, means that the relation between 
probabilistic states and probability spaces is many to many. 
The fact that the relation between probabilistic states and probability spaces is many to many, is 
important. Roughly because it clarifies why the fact that the same k-event can have different k-
probabilities does not imply that the same event can have different probabilities. As was mentioned 
in section 3, according to the definition of the probability space, there can be infinitely many 
probability measures defined over the same σ-algebra. This means that the same k-event 
(according to the identity relation between σ-algebras) can have different k-probabilities (unless it 
is the empty k-event or the sample space k-event). However, since the relation between 
probabilistic states and probability spaces is many to many, this fact about k-events does not imply 
that the same event can have different probabilities. It is possible that for each k-probability a k-
event has, that k-event mathematically describes a different event. In other words, it is possible 
that all probability spaces that have the same sample space and σ-algebra components but different 
probability measures, mathematically describe different probabilistic states and specifically 
different events.  
Hence, the fact that there can be infinitely many probability measures defined over the same σ-
algebra, does not help to settle the question whether an equivalence relation between k-events, 
should depend on their k-probabilities or not. This means that this mathematical fact does not 
answer the question whether the same event can have different probabilities or not. Thus, the 
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answer to this question depends on the choice of interpretation of probability. This means that the 
claim that nonempty events with zero probability have it only contingently, is also interpretation-
dependent. In other words, interpretations according to which the same event can have different 
probabilities, can accommodate the claim that nonempty events with zero probability are possible 
because they have it only contingently. While other interpretations, cannot. 
 
In this section I showed that Kolmogorov's theory can accommodate two different types of 
equivalence relations between k-events: those which support the claim that the same event can 
have different probabilities, and those which undermine it. I explained that deciding between these 
types cannot be done within Kolmogorov's theory. As a result, the question whether the same event 
can have different probabilities turns out to be interpretation-dependent. This means that the claim 
that nonempty events with zero probability have it only contingently, is also interpretation-
dependent. Thus, nonempty events with zero probability are commonly claimed to be possible 
mainly because they are nonempty. This claim can also be made on the grounds that the zero 
probability is assumed to be a contingent fact and not a necessary one. But this latter reason 
depends on the choice of interpretation and not on Kolmogorov's formalism. 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
In this paper I took on Hájek's challenge and provided an explanation for the widely accepted claim 
that zero probability does not mean impossibility. The explanation I offered is relevant to all 
interpretations of Kolmogorov's probability theory since it is based solely on his formalism. More 
accurately, I have explained why events described by nonempty k-events with zero k-probability 
are commonly claimed to be possible, despite having zero probability. I have claimed that there 
are two different senses of possibility expressed by Kolmogorov's probability space. One sense is 
expressed by k-events being nonempty and the other by k-probabilities being strictly positive. 
According to the first sense, events described by nonempty k-events are commonly considered as 
possible because they are nonempty. Being a nonempty event means roughly that the event is a 
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nonempty collection of the different possibilities (or alternatives, or options) which constitute a 
particular probabilistic state. Hence a nonempty event is possible in the sense that it corresponds 
to such possibilities. Likewise, an empty event is always considered as impossible since it does 
not correspond to any of the possibilities which constitute a particular probabilistic state. This 
means that the claim that zero probability does not mean impossibility, refers only to nonempty 
events. 
According to the second sense of possibility, events that have probabilities described by strictly 
positive k-probabilities, are commonly considered as possible. The exact sense of possibility is 
determined by the choice of interpretation of probability. This sense of possibility is relevant for 
explaining the claim that zero probability does not mean impossibility, for two reasons: The first 
concerns the case where the zero k-probability is said to describe infinitesimal probabilities. In 
other words, the zero k-probability does not describe a probability value which is exactly zero. 
Thus, the described events have probabilities which are strictly positive and hence are possible. 
The second reason concern the case where the zero k-probability describes a probability value 
which is exactly zero. In this case, the nonempty events with exactly zero probability are 
considered as possible because they are nonempty but also because it is claimed that they can have 
strictly positive probability values and thus be possible. 
More accurately, I distinguished between cases when the zero k-probability mathematically 
describes infinitesimal probabilities and cases where it describes exactly zero probability. In the 
first case, the zero k-probability is in fact a mathematical description which approximates a strictly 
positive probability value that is not zero. Thus, it does not indicate that the described event is 
impossible in the sense expressed by zero probability. In this case, the nonempty k-events with 
zero k-probability describe nonempty events that have strictly positive (though infinitesimal) 
probabilities. Such events are considered as possible in the two aforementioned senses of 
possibility. 
In the second case, the zero k-probability describe a probability value which is exactly zero (and 
not an infinitesimal). Thus, the described events are nonempty with exactly zero probability. In 
this case, these events are commonly considered as possible mainly because they are nonempty. 
However, there is another reason for claiming that such events are possible. This reason is based 
on the claim that the same event can have different probabilities. If this claim is true, then it might 
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be possible for nonempty events with zero probability to have strictly positive probabilities and 
thus be possible. Loosely speaking, it is possible for such events to be possible and that is why 
they are considered as possible.  
I have showed that the claim that the same event can have different probabilities does not stem 
from Kolmogorov's theory. In fact, Kolmogorov's theory is consistent with both this claim and its 
negation. More specifically, in order to mathematically justify this claim, one has to assume an 
equivalence relation between k-events (in the sense that they describe the same event) that does 
not depend on their k-probabilities. The crucial point is that such an assumption is not part of 
Kolmogorov's theory. Kolmogorov's theory can accommodate two different types of equivalence 
relations between k-events: those which support this claim and those which undermine it. The first 
kind is based on some equivalence relation between σ-algebras and the second, on an equivalence 
relation between probability spaces. Thus, it turns out that the question whether the same event 
can have different probabilities is interpretation-dependent. Specifically, it implies that the claim 
that nonempty events with zero probability can have strictly positive probabilities, is 
interpretation-dependent. This means that claiming that nonempty events with exactly zero 
probability are possible because they can have other probability values, depends in fact, on the 
choice of interpretation and not on Kolmogorov's formalism. 
 
In summary, it is commonly claimed that zero probability does not mean impossibility because of 
the following reasons: The main reason is that nonempty events are considered as possible 
regardless of their probabilities, simply because they are nonempty. Another reason is that 
sometimes the "zero probability" is meant to refer to zero k-probability which approximates some 
infinitesimal probability value. Such a value is strictly positive and thus does not imply 
impossibility. And the last reason is that there are interpretations in which it is assumed that the 
same event can have different probabilities. Specifically, an event with exactly zero probability 
can have strictly positive probabilities. This implies that such an event can be possible which 
means that its zero probability does not mean impossibility.  
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